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Union duopoly with homogeneous labor:  
The effect of membership and employment 
constraints 
 
By Ana Paula MARTINS1† 
 
Abstract. This research analyzes the labor market outcome when there are two unions in the 
industry, representing homogeneous workers (hence, unions use employment strategies), in 
the presence of union employment (quantity) constraints. Three strategic environments are 
considered: Nash-Cournot duopoly, Stackelberg duopoly and efficient cooperation between 
the two unions. Employment constraints -ceilings and floors- originate kinks and/or 
discontinuities in the reaction functions, leading to corner solutions and special features of 
the labor market equilibrium. Two types of constraints are discussed. One is insufficient 
employed membership (ceiling) for the interior solution. Then it may be optimal for a 
Stackelberg leader to push the other to the bound. The other case considered is the legal 
requirement of a minimum number of employed members that the union must have to be 
constituted. Entry-deterrence strategies of the leading union may then emerge.  
Keywords. Unions, Wage determination models, Union bargaining, Corporatism, Imperfect 
competition and union behavior, Union oligopoly, Union membership, Union 
representativeness, Occupational licensure. 
JEL. J51, E24, D45, D49, C79. 
 
1. Introduction  
his paper considers a two-union closed-shop equilibrium and studies 
the effect of quantity or employment constraints that generate corner 
solutions in the labor market equilibrium. These constraints may be 
legally induced; they can be used as tools for employment-enhancing 
policies in strongly unionized (or corporatized) economies, professions and 
industries. 
The multiple union case has been previously studied in the literature. 
Oswald (1979) 1 departs from unions with price competition strategies - 
framework also used by Gylfason & Lindbeck (1984a) and (1984b) 2 - and 
derives the properties of the Cournot 3-Nash 4 equilibrium, comparing it 
with the Stackelberg 5  one and even describing efficient cooperation 6 
between unions. He assumes heterogeneous labor with substitutability 
between workers. Martins & Coimbra (1997 and 1997a) analyze the 
equilibrium solutions for homogeneous workers in a market with two and 
n unions; as Hart´s (1982) syndicates, unions employ quantity rather than 
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price strategies. The assumption applies whenever unions can influence 
lay-off regulation – as is the case for Portugal, for example. 
In the standard imperfect competition framework, pure or unqualified 
quantity restrictions leading to corner solutions have not been assigned 
particular interest. However, two problems can be addressed in the union 
case. Both introduce kinks and one discontinuities in the affected union's 
reaction function.  
The first case we address is insufficient number of members of one of the 
unions to achieve the interior solution. The effect of a membership 
constraint has been studied in a monopoly union framework by Carruth & 
Oswald (1987) in a different context - they model the restriction as 
embedded in the union's utility function and analyze the possible 
implications for the hiring of outsiders. Instead, we focus on a two union 
scenario, and start by general utility functions in a closed-shop. If one of the 
unions reaches the bound, the other may behave as a monopolist with 
respect to residual demand; and we suggest the possible advantage for the 
"larger" union to decrease her own employed members and push the other 
to the membership constraint.  
Employment ceilings (limits of access to employment) may have an 
immediate application in the study of occupational licensure, the analysis 
reflecting Friedman’s (1962,1982) historical exposition on its effects: if 
licensing may provide consumer protection in an imperfectly informed 
world, it can also be used by an incumbent group to secure monopoly 
(oligopoly, monopolistic) power over a specific market - the argument is 
mathematical, yet simply, developed below. The bound can be seen to 
work through the recognition of diplomas or certification requirements for, 
say, an immigrant group. One can offer a practical application of this 
environment in the Portuguese dentist market: Brasilian dentists co-existed 
in the market but illegaly - only recently have they achieved recognition – 
with recognized Portuguese dentists. The same can be said about formal 
and parallel medicine. In such cases, professional associations, take the role 
of “our” union – and usually fight for barriers to foreign diploma´s 
recognition. 
The other case is the existence of union representative rules (laws) or 
minimum employment requirements. Say the union to be considered legal 
must exhibit a minimum number of employed members. The hypothesis, 
which is realistic, was introduced in the n-union framework by Martins & 
Coimbra (1997a) to explain, or rather, limit union formation; for example, 
Portuguese labor law requires a minimum of 10% of target workers or 2000 
workers present for a founding assembly to function 7. The existence of 
such laws, again, may lead to corner solutions; or may elicit entry-
deterrence - "limit output" - practices by the incumbent 8. The research in 
this respect shows analogies with the capacity constraint literature for the 
product market, such as Dixit's (1979) problem 9, with entry-deterrence 
working in the union framework through overemployment of the 
incumbent. 
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The implications of the two constraints are studied for the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, the Stackelberg solution and for cooperative unions. Some of 
the strategic behavior analyzed is more plausible in Stackelberg than in the 
Cournot-Nash framework - for example, employment-pushing and entry-
deterrence practices. Others may arise in both situations. 
This research is mainly theoretical; it has empirical relevance in the 
understanding of the behavior of industry unions, in the presence of 
representative requirement rules. The closed-shop environment reproduces 
the scenario where bargaining agreements are extended to non-unionized 
workers – as they usually are in Portugal: if unionisation was around 30% 
in the early nineties, the collective bargaining coverage rate – number of 
workers covered by collective agreements as a percentage of wage and 
salary earners - was almost 80%, according to OECD 10; the proportion of 
non-self-employed covered seems to have remained stable in the second 
half of the decade 11. The duopoly setting applies, for example, to Portugal, 
where some industries or professions are represented by two unions. At the 
macro or aggregate level, in the first half of the nineties, two union 
confederations 12 represented 88% of Portuguese unionised workers, the 
behavior of which this research may also address; insufficient membership, 
for example, may have conditioned the behavior of the newer 
confederation 13 in its early stages; and may have affected (formally, the 
corresponding restriction can become active after more or less sudden 
decreases in unionised affiliates) the older confederation, that lost, on 
average, 46% of its members from 1979-84 to 1991-95 14. 
Interior solution results and notation are summarized in section II. 
Insufficient membership for internal solutions is dealt with in section III. 
Implications of the existence of a minimum employed members 
requirement is advanced in section IV. The exposition ends with a brief 
summary in section V, which includes tables with the main analytical 
results along with those for an example.  
 
2. Union duopoly: Interior solutions 15. 
Consider that we have two unions, 1 and 2. Let Li be the employed 
members of union i, and W the wage rate. The labor demand in the market 
is given by: 
 
L1 + L2 = L(W),       or        (1) 
W = W(L1 + L2)  =  P FL
(L1 + L2)        (2) 
 
Workers are perfect substitutes and the wage set by firms will be 
extended to all workers - or firms will equate marginal product for the two 
types of workers, or will only hire workers of lower wage. 
Assume 
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a) each union has utility function of the general form Ui(Li,W), 




 - the 
marginal rate of substitution between employment and wage - decrease 
with Li and increases with W. 
b) the demand function is given by (1), decreasing in W, coming from 
maximization (in L = L1 + L2) of the (aggregate) profit function (L,W). 
Therefore, (2) establishes the value of the marginal product of labor, equal 
for both types of workers 16. 
c) a sort of closed-shop setting, i.e., the firm(s) can only hire unionized 
workers, either from union 1 or 2. 
 
2.1. Cournot-Nash duopoly 
Each union maximizes 
 
Max  Ui(Li, W)        (3) 
Li, W 
s.t.:    L1 + L2 = L(W)    or      W = W(L1 + L2) = P FL(L1 + L2) 
 
or, alternatively: 











 = 0     ,     i =1,2          (5) 
 
(5) establishes the optimal policy of union i given union j's employment 
strategy, i.e., union i's reaction function: 
 
Li = R
i(Lj)      i = 1, 2 ;   j = 2, 1       (6) 
 










  =  - W
L









  =  - L
W
      
 
and the demand function. 
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Alternatively, the equilibrium labor market outcome is defined by the 
two equations (and labor demand which defines the wage): 
 
L1 = R
1(L2)             and  L2 = R





1[R2(L1)]      and / or L2 = R
2[R1(L2)]     (9)   
 
As in the standard imperfect competition problem, (static) stability 17 is 
only achieved iff - for negatively sloped reaction functions: 
 
| dR2 / dL1 |   1 / | dR
1 / dL2 |       (10) 
 
This will be satisfied if both unions' reaction functions have slope 
smaller than 1 in absolute value, i.e., | dR2 / dL1 | ≤ 1 and | dR
1 / dL2 | ≤ 1. 
Therefore, we will assume continuous, smooth and well-behaved reaction 
functions Ri(Lj) - derived as in (6) -, and that: 
 
- 1  <  dRi(Lj) / dLj  <  0       (11) 
 
Given that we have only two unions, we can represent the equilibrium 
solution in the space (L1, L2) - analogous to the conventional product 
market solution for quantities of an homogeneous good sold by two firms. 
This is presented in Fig. 1 below. PN is union 1's reaction function and MQ 
is union 2's. Each union's indifference curve will have the general form: 
 
Ui[Li, W(L1 + L2)]  =  U
_
i      ,    i = 1, 2     (12) 
 
Once the reaction functions come from (5), each union's indifference 
curve has a maximum on its reaction function. The level of utility increases 
as we approach, on the reaction curve, the union's employment axis; that 
curve crosses this axis at the monopoly union solution (where the other 
union's employment is 0). 
Both reaction functions are negatively sloped, obeying condition (10). 
They cross at point A, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
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2.2. Stackelberg duopoly 
Take now the case where union 1 operates as a leader and union 2 
responds as its follower. Then the leader solves: 
 
Max    U1[L1, W(L1 + L2)]       (12) 







 = 0      or     L2 = R
2(L1)  
 
Constructing the Lagrangean, or replacing the restriction in the utility 




















  = - W
L
      (15) 
 
We can see the Stackelberg solution in Fig. 1. Union 1 picks the point on 
2's reaction function which allows her to reach the highest level of utility, 
i.e., the indifference curve closer to the L1 axis that touches 2's reaction 
function. This is point B. Confronting with A, the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, the leader reaches now a higher employment and utility level, 
and the follower smaller levels, than in the Cournot-Nash solution. Total 
employment will be larger than in the Cournot solution: the Stackelberg 
equilibrium, point B, is on 2's reaction function, with slope smaller than one 
in absolute value, to the right of and below A. 
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3.3. Efficient cooperation between the unions 
Assume the unions cooperate efficiently. That is, the two unions 
maximize the Nash-bargaining problem: 
 




  [U2(L2, W) - U
_
2]     (16) 
L1, L2, W 






2 denote the alternative utility of each union in case of no 
agreement. Eventually, U
_
i would be the utility union i gets in the Cournot 
game 18.  corresponds to the relative strength of union 1 with respect to 










  =  - L
W
          (17) 
 
We immediately expect a higher W and a lower L when cooperation 
between unions is established. 
If we replace the demand schedule - W = W(L1 + L2) - in (17), this 
equation defines the "efficiency locus" 20 - a relation between L1 and L2 
where the utility of one of the unions is maximized given the utility level of 
the other -, given that employers react on the demand.  
From F.O.C., we can also derive: 
 
  =  ,*U1(L1, W) - U
_






)    (18) 
 
Replacing, again, the demand schedule, this equation establishes the 
"distribution locus" - a relation between L1 and L2.  
The intersection of the efficiency locus and the distribution locus yields 
the particular solution of the problem.  
We can see the equilibrium, again, in Fig. 1. The efficiency locus is MN, a 
curve formed by the intersection of the two unions' indifference curves; it 
should cross the axis of Li (i=1, 2) at the same point where i's reaction curve 
does, once this point determines the monopoly solution for union i. If U
_
i is 
the utility union i gets in the Cournot game, the distribution equation will 
cross the efficiency locus between points E and F - points on the 
indifference curves of each union corresponding to their utility level in the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The efficient bargaining equilibrium is, thus, 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
 A.P. Martins, JEB, 7(3), 2020, p.127-162. 
134 
134 
point C. In general, we expect lower employment than in the previous 
solutions - distribution between the unions depending on the location of 
the distribution locus, and, therefore, also on . 
 
4. Insufficient membership 
Assume that a particular union i has an exogenously fixed number of 
members Mi which is smaller than the equilibrium level of employment 
corresponding to the interior solution. What will this imply for the labor 
market outcome? Will the other (presumably larger) union have any 
advantage in restricting its own quantity in order to make the former reach 
its bound, i.e., the employment ceiling? 
 
4.1. Cournot duopoly 
1. Consider that the two unions are Cournot duopolists. Then, we know 
that for an interior solution: 
 
Li = R
i(Lj)    i =1,2,    j=2,1       (19) 
 
Alternatively, the equilibrium Li* satisfies: 
 
Li* = R
i(Rj(Li*))    i =1,2,    j=2,1      (20) 
 
2. If R2(R1(L2*)) > M2, then: 
 
L2 =  M2       and       L1 = R
1(M2)      (21) 
 
This would seem to require that: 
 
R2(R1(M2)) > M2         (22) 
 
That if R2(R1(L2*)) > M2, then R
2(R1(M2)) > M2, is proven in the 
Appendix. 
Being the reaction functions negatively sloped, union 1 will benefit, to 
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 = 0      at   L2 = M2  ,    or     L1 = R
1(M2)   (24) 
 
Union 1 will have higher employment - once reaction functions are 
negatively sloped - and attain higher utility level than if 2's members 
allowed the interior solution.  
We can see the new solution in Fig. 2. Graphically, 2's reaction function, 
MN without restriction, now becomes M2BN, being M2 the number of 
members of union 2 and smaller than employment of union 2 in the 
unrestricted Cournot equilibrium, point A. With insufficient membership 







1's  reaction function













3. In a corner solution for union i: 
 
L = M2 +  R




W = W(M2 +  R
1(M2))       (26) 
 
An increase in membership of union 2, M2, will have an impact such 
that: 
 
dL/dM2  = 1 +  dR
1/dL2(M2)        (27) 
 
Total quantity will increase (equilibrium wage will decrease) with 
membership of union i as long as: 
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dR1(M2)/dL2  > -1        (28) 
 
This is included in condition (11). 
As M2 increases, we tend to the Cournot solution - as we can see in Fig. 
2. Having 1's the reaction functions slope smaller than 1 in absolute value, 
the corner solution will - given (27)-(28) -, imply a smaller total 
employment and higher wage than the interior solution. 
 
Proposition 1: If membership is not sufficient for an internal solution in 
a  
 Cournot duopoly: 
 1. the small union will employ all its members. 
 2. the large union will behave as a monopolist with respect to the 
residual  
 demand. It will have higher employment and attain a higher utility 
level  
 than in the interior solution. 
 3. Total employment will be smaller and the wage higher than in the  
 interior solution. 
 4. An increase in membership of the small union will decrease the 
other  
 union's employment, increase total employment and decrease the 
wage. 
 
4.2. Stackelberg equilibrium 
Consider now that we have a Stackelberg environment and the leader, 1, 












 dR2 / dL1  =  0    ,    (29) 
 
L2 = R





  = - W
L
      (30) 
and also the labor demand equation. 









) > M2. Then, obviously, L2 = M2. But in that case 
the leader considers that the follower, at the margin, does not respond to its 








 = 0      and   L2  = M2       (31) 
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i.e., the leader reacts to M2 according to its reaction function, being the 
equilibrium solution:  
 
L1 = R
1(M2)      and   L2 = M2       (32) 
 
Being R2(L1) negatively sloped, if M2 is close to R
2(L1
S
) we conclude, 
comparing (29) with (31), that at the new L1* = R
1(M2), (29) is negative. 
Therefore L1
S
 < L1*. Also, union 1's utility level will be higher that at L1
S
. 
The features of the corner equilibrium are altogether similar to the ones 
of the Cournot constrained solution - graphically, they coincide. Given, 
also, that the Stackelberg equilibrium yields higher total employment than 
the Cournot outcome - once it is on 2's reaction function below it -, the 
corner solution will imply a smaller total employment than the 
unconstrained Stackelberg one. If M2 is small enough, the leader's 
employment may be higher than in the Stackelberg equilibrium (at the 
limit, if M2 is 0, the leader chooses the monopoly union solution; this may 
imply a higher employment for the leader than the Stackelberg 
equilibrium); but if not, the leader's employment does not need to be so 
large as in the unconstrained case. 
 
Proposition 2: For a Stackelberg duopoly, being the leader the large 
union: 
 1. 1., 3. and 4. of Proposition 1 hold when there is insufficient  
 membership of the follower to ensure the interior solution. 
 2. the large union will behave as a monopolist with respect to the 
residual demand. It may have smaller employment than in the 





) < M2, we can have the standard interior Stackelberg solution. 
But an interesting possibility may occur: it may be worthwhile for the 
leader to decrease its employment and force the other union to employ all 
its members. This is the issue taken below. 
 
4.3. "Employment-pushing" 
Consider that we have the Stackelberg scenario above but that R2(L1
S
) 
< M2. It may be the case that it is worthwhile for union 1 to establish an 
L1** < L1
S
 and make union 2 reach its bound. This allows union 1 to 
behave as a monopolist with respect to the residual demand.  
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)]} <  U1{R1(M2) , W[R
1(M2) +M2]}  (33) 
 
Clearly, this can happen iff there is equilibrium stability. Let us see Fig. 
3. The unrestricted Stackelberg equilibrium yielded point A, which was 
possible with union's members, M2. If M2 < M - where M is the 
employment of union 2 that corresponds to the point where 1's indifference 
curve attained in the Stackelberg solution crosses 1's reaction function -, 
union 1 may decrease its quantity and still benefit from the fact that 2 can 
no longer expand its own employment. 1 chooses the point more to the 
south that touches the new reaction function M2BN, i.e., the new solution is 






1's  reaction function








From the figure we can also conclude that such possibility did not exist 









)]} = U1{R1(M) , W[R1(M) + M]}   (34) 
 
Then, if M2 > M > R
2(L1
S




), union 1 decreases its quantity in order to restrict reaction of 
the opponent. It chooses an L1** such that: 
 
L1** = R
1(M2)         (35) 
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In this solution, 
 
L = R1(M2) + M2        (36) 
 
and therefore, an increase in membership of union 2 will lead to: 
 
dL/dM2 = dR
1/dL2(M2) + 1       (37) 
 
This will be positive iff: 
 
dR1/dL2(M2) >  - 1        (38) 
 
which is guaranteed by (11). Then, an increase of M2 around this 
equilibrium will lead to an increase in total employment and a decrease in 
the equilibrium wage. Total employment will be smaller than in the interior 
solution: the Cournot outcome originates a smaller total employment than 
the Stackelberg equilibrium; and point C is on 1's reaction function - with 
slope smaller than 1 in absolute value - to the right of the Cournot solution 
and therefore with lower employment than the latter. 
 
Proposition 3: In a Stackelberg duopoly, when membership of the 
follower, even if sufficient for the interior solution, is near the latter: 
1. it may be "profitable" for the union leader to decrease its own 
employment relative to the Stackelberg outcome in order to be able to 
behave as a monopolist with respect to residual demand. 
2. If the behavior of the leader is the one described in 1. of this 
proposition, 3. and 4. of Proposition 1. hold. 
Notice that whenever one of the unions is pushed to the employment 
ceiling, a change in the bound will have the same effect on the equilibrium 
level of total employment. The constrained solution will always imply a 
smaller total employment and higher wage than the corresponding interior 
solution. 
Also, the large union always benefits from restricting membership of the 
other union – that is, in professional markets, the recognition of foreign 
certificates by national institutions may be seen as a means of constraining 
membership of the “fringe” union. Alternatively, immigration constraints 
may have the same effect. 
 
4.4. Efficient bargaining between unions 
Consider the efficient bargaining solution when there are membership 
bounds. It is clear that if union members could be switched from one union 
to the other, we would eventually arrive at the interior efficient bargaining 
solution of section II.3. 
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Let us instead consider the case in which such behavior is not possible. 
Assume the small union is 2 - the only union that will be affected by a 
ceiling (we assume the other is a "large" union). Then the efficient 
bargaining problem can be stated for the membership ceilings as: 
 




  [U2(L2, W) - U
_
2]     (39) 
L1, L2, W 
s.t.:    L1 + L2 = L(W)    or      W = W(L1 + L2)    and 
 L2    M2   
 








2}+ (M2 - L2) (40) 
 L1, L2 
 
If the interior solution of the efficient bargaining problem without the 
restriction originates an L2* < M2, we will stay in the interior solution. If 
not, the corner solution, from first derivative with respect to L1 - which will 
hold both in restricted or unrestricted solutions - will yield that, at L2 = M2, 








) / [U1 - U
_




 / [U2 - U
_
2] = 0   (41) 
 
Then this equality determines L
1
. 
The new solution does not obey either the previously defined efficiency 
or distribution locus. But we conclude that, if (41) (at least near the relevant 
range) increases with L
2
 (then, at an M
2
 smaller than the unrestricted 
efficient bargaining solution, (41) is negative and the maximand (40) is 




 will be smaller than if the restriction was 
not binding, i.e., than its unrestricted equilibrium level. The opposite will 
occur if (41) decreases with L
2
 - we could not rule this out, once it depends 
on second derivatives also of labor demand. 
It seems more plausible that L
1
 should be now smaller than when the 
bound was not imposed. The intuition for this is that, with efficient 
bargaining, as union 2 cannot benefit from additional employment, it will 
try, within the coalition, to compensate by asking a rise in the wage - hence, 
a decrease in employment of the other union. 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
 A.P. Martins, JEB, 7(3), 2020, p.127-162. 
141 
141 
On the other hand, we have seen that in most of the Cournot and 
Stackelberg cases, in the corner solution where one union employs all its 
members, the other reacts according to its reaction function - behaving as a 








 = 0    at/and    L2 = M2     (42) 
 
Looking at (41) - which has the sign of ∂/∂L1, where  denotes the 
lagrangean (40) -, at M2 and the L1 of the solution of (42), the left hand-side 




 / [U2 - U
_
2] - is negative; this implies that the 
maximand (40) is already decreasing: the efficient bargaining solution 
when the membership restriction is active will yield a lower L1 than the 
solution of (42). 
 
Proposition 4: With efficient bargaining between the unions and 
insufficient membership of one of the unions: 
1. employment of the union not affected by the ceiling may be lower or 
higher than in the interior solution. 
2. employment of the union not affected by the ceiling is lower than if 
she reacted as a monopolist with respect to residual demand. 
 
5. Employed membership requirements 
Suppose now that there are "minimum employment" laws: for a union to 
be legally constituted it must have at least a minimum of L
_
 employed 
members. Alternatively, we could interpret such bound as the minimum 
level of employment the union is willing to accept - as in the general Stone-
Geary function. We inquire, below:  
- what is the labor market outcome. 
- in which conditions will the incumbent(s) engage in entry-deterrence 
practices. 
5.1. Cournot duopoly 




        (43) 
 




          (44) 
 
Now, we will have that 
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)         (45) 
 
Because reaction functions are negatively sloped, 1's employment will 
decrease, relative to the case with no constraint and both unions will be 
worse-off in terms of utility. 
Let us see the equilibrium solution in Fig. 4., where we consider that 
union 2 is the one affected by the constraint. 2's reaction function is equal to 
the old one from the L2 axis, i.e., from M to B (till L2= L
_
) - where the curve 
shows a kink - and an horizontal line afterwards till point C. At point C, 
union 2 is indifferent between employing L
_
 and closing - point C is in the 
same indifference curve that crosses the old reaction function at the point 
where L2 = 0; after C, i.e., if L1 > D, union 2 gives up the market and its 
reaction function continues in DN.  
In sum, the effect of the minimum employment restriction on union 2 - 
assume the other is a "large union" - is to switch its reaction function from 
MN to MBC - with a kink at B - and with a discontinuity after C, continuing 
in DN.    
The intersection of the two reaction functions switches from A, the 
interior Cournot equilibrium, to E when the employment restriction is 









1's  reaction function












Notice that in point E, union 2 may be better-off than in point A: as long 
as L
_
 is smaller than the level at which union 2's indifference curve that 
crosses A touches 1's reaction function. Union 1 will always loose utility 
with the bound. 
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Total employment will be larger than if the bound was not imposed, 
once E is to the the North-West of A on 1's reaction function, with slope 
smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
Total employment will be: 
 
L =  L
_
 +  R1(L
_
)         (46) 
 
An increase in L
_
 will increase total employment (decrease the wage rate) 
iff: 
 
1 +  dR1/dL2(L
_






) | < 1           (48) 
 
It is easy to show that with stability and around L2*,  
 
R2(R1(L2*)) = L2*  <  R
2(R1(L
_
))  <  L
_
      (49) 
 
and therefore, no problem will occur for the solution in the corner. 
Proposition 5: If Cournot duopoly implies for a particular union a 
solution such that its employment is smaller than the membership floor: 
1. The union's employment equals the floor (provided it is smaller than 
its membership). It may attain a higher utility level than in the interior 
solution. 
2. The other union will behave as a monopolist with respect to the 
residual demand, but will have a lower utility level and smaller 
employment than in the unconstrained equilibrium. 
3. An increase in the membership floor will decrease the other union's 
employment, increase total employment and decrease the wage. 
4. Employment is larger and the wage lower than in the interior 
solution. 
2.  If  L2* = R
2[R1(L2*)] > L
_
, we expect the Cournot solution to hold. 
 
5.2. Stackelberg equilibrium 
Consider now that we have a Stackelberg equilibrium. Suppose the 
leader is union 1, and the constraint is binding for union 2. 
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1's  reaction function










In the picture, L
_
 is smaller than the value of L2 in the Cournot game. 
Then, the best the Stackelberg leader can now do is to choose the corner B, 










)-1         (51) 
 






        (52) 
 






)] + 1       (53) 
 
This will be negative, if, with 2's reaction function is negatively sloped, 
2's reaction function has slope smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
From Fig. 5, we also conclude that total employment will be smaller than 
if the bound was not imposed, once B is to the the North-West of A on 2's 
reaction function, with slope smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
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Proposition 6: For a Stackelberg duopoly, if the floor is smaller than the 
follower solution in a Cournot environment, but larger than the follower's 
employment under the Stackelberg equilibrium: 
1. The leader's solution corresponds to the inverse of the followers 
reaction function evaluated at the bound L
_
. The leader will loose utility and 
lower its employment relative to the unconstrained Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
2. The follower will employ the amount L
_
 and attain a higher utility than 
in the interior solution. 
3. An increase in the floor will decrease the leader's employment; it will 
decrease total employment and increase the wage (till the floor reaches the 
follower's Cournot solution). 
4. Employment is smaller and wage higher than in the interior solution. 
2. If L
_
 is larger than the value of L2 in the Cournot game, the best the 
Stackelberg leader can now do is to react according to its reaction function, 
i.e., to behave as a monopolist with respect to the residual demand, and we 
have the same equilibrium properties as in the constrained Cournot 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 7: For a Stackelberg duopoly, if the floor is larger than the 
follower solution in a Cournot environment, the equilibrium will have the 
same features as the two-follower (constrained) case: 
1. The leader reacts according to its reaction function. It will show a 
lower utility than in the unconstrained maximum. 
2. The follower will employ the amount L
_
 and may attain a higher utility 
level than in the interior solution. 
3. An increase in the floor will decrease the leader's employment; it will 
increase total employment and decrease the wage. 
4. Employment may be larger or smaller and wage lower or higher than 
in the interior solution. 
3. Finally: 
Proposition 8: If L
_
 is lower than the value of L2 of the Stackelberg game, 
the membership restriction will be inactive. 
 
5.3. Entry-deterrence behavior 
Consider now the possibility of union 1 deterring entrance. Let us look 
at Fig. 5. Union 1 indifference curve that touches point B, crosses the L1 axis 
to the left of D. If union 1 chooses L1 = D union 2 will go out of the market, 
say, it drives wages to zero. In that case it was not worthwhile. But it can 
happen something like what is depicted in Fig. 6. In this case, clearly union 
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1 prefers to deter entrance, once the indiference curve that touches point B 






1's  reaction function










She will achieve it by setting an L1 of point D, which is the same as of 
point C. Point C is, at L2 = L
_
, on 2's indifference curve that touches its 




, W(L1 + L
_
)]  =  U2{0, W[R2(0)-1]}     (54) 
 
If we assume that unions' utility will only be equal to the utility level at 
0 employment if (either own employment or) wage is 0, then L1 must be 
such that if the potential entrant enters at the required L
_
, it drives wages to 
zero 21. That is, to deter entrance, union 1 has to set : 
 
L1 =  L(0) - L
_
 = L         (55) 
 
Then, employment decreases with the membership floor. Notice, 
however, that if both unions are affected by the floor, employment may 
actually increase when the floor increases. That is, if L(0) -  L
_
  >  L
_
, or  L
_
  < 
L(0) / 2 - otherwise the incumbent will also hit the bound with this policy, 
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W = W[L(0) -  L
_
]        (56) 
 
Clearly, this will be profitable iff: 
 
Case A: For R2(L1
S
) <  L
_










, W[L(0) -  L
_






]}   (57) 
 
That is, it must yield higher utility than allowing the other union to 




Case B: For R2(L1
S







This corresponds to the situation of Proposition 7. In this case, the best 
union 1 could do was to react according to its reaction function. Well, this 




, W[L(0) - L
_






]}   (58) 
 








1's  reaction function
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This corresponds to the situation of Proposition 8. Then, it may occur 
that it is more profitable to deter entrance than to allow the other union to 




, W[L(0) - L
_






)]}   (59) 
 







1's  reaction function










Entry-deterrence may be more likely when 1 is a leader and 2 a follower. 
However, it can happen that 1 is a follower - or that it will end up by 
sharing the market in a Cournot game. Then we have similar conclusions as 
above, with L1
S
 replaced by L1* = R
1(R2(L1*)) in (59) of case C.  
Notice that if we have a Cournot outcome, it may be worthwhile for the 
incumbent to engage in entry-deterrence even if L
_
 = 0 (this will not occur 
for a Stackelberg equilibrium). 
Proposition 9: 1. Entry deterrence by employment expansion may be 
profitable for a union leader when there are membership floors.  
2. If it is, an increase in the membership floor will decrease total 
employment (equal to the leader's employment) and increase the wage - 
unless the leader has reached the floor itself. 
3. Propositions 6, 7 and 8 hold with an addition: "provided entry-
deterrence is not more profitable". 
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5.4. Efficient bargaining between unions 
If only the second union is affected by the minimum employment 
requirement, the Nash-maximand becomes: 
 




  [U2(L2, W) - U
_
2]     (60) 
L1, L2, W 
s.t.:    L1 + L2 = L(W)    or      W = W(L1 + L2) 













)  (61) 
   L1, L2 
 
If the interior solution of the efficient bargaining problem without the 
restriction originates an L2* > L
_
, we will stay in the interior solution. If not, 
the corner solution, from first derivative with respect to L1 - which will 











) / [U1 - U
_




 / [U2 - U
_
2] = 0   (62) 
 
and labor demand applies. (62) determines L1. Notice that whenever we 








 = 0            (63) 
 
Therefore at that solution the maximand (61) is already decreasing - the 
efficient bargaining solution will yield a lower L1 than if 1 reacted as a 
monopolist with respect to residual demand.  
Proposition 10: With efficient bargaining between the unions, 
employment of the union not affected by the floor is lower than if the other 
union behaved as a monopolist towards residual demand - i.e., according 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
The paper extends the framework to model union competition behavior 
for employment in the presence of employment restrictions that prevent 
interior solutions. In particular, we analyzed the effects of insufficient 
membership and of the existence of minimum union employment (or 
employed membership) rules. 
We focussed on the case with two unions and homogeneous labor, and 
investigate the features of the labor market outcomes when the unions 
behave as Cournot, Stackelberg or cooperate efficiently.  
The main results can be summarized as follows: 
1. An employment ceiling affecting one of the unions (or insufficient 
membership of one of the unions to attain the interior solution) will always 
benefit the other - no matter if the latter acts as a leader or as a Cournot 
follower -, which will be able to behave as a monopolist with respect to 
residual demand and lower its own employment.  
If one of the unions is a Stackelberg leader and membership of the other 
is sufficient for the interior solution, the leader may find it worthwhile to 
decrease his employment pushing the other's to the bound. 
In any case, when one of the union employs all its membership (i.e., is or 
is forced to the bound), total employment will be lower (the wage higher) 
than in the interior solution. An increase in that union's members will 
decrease the other's employment and raise total employment.  
With a Stone-Geary utility function (U
i
(Li,W)  =  W
i  Li
(1 - i), 
0 < 

i < 1) and linear demand schedule (W = a - b (L1 + L2)) – results 
summarized in Tables 3 and 4 -, we concluded that insufficient 
membership is more likely to affect unions with higher preference for 
employment relative to wage. The cooperative solution will imply a larger 
employment of the unaffected union, and a smaller total employment 
(higher equilibrium wage) than in the unconstrained maximum. 
2. Minimum employed members´ rules (: a minimum employed 
membership is required for a union to be considered legal) produce kinks 
and discontinuities in the unions' reaction functions. In general, these rules 
may benefit the union that faces the constraint directly; they will decrease 
the other union's utility relative to the interior solution. If the equilibrium - 
Cournot, Stackelberg or cooperative between unions - implies that a 
follower's interior solution is lower than the floor, his employment is 
pushed to this floor. An increase of the legal minimum will always increase 
total employment and decrease the equilibrium wage in a Cournot game; 
total employment is smaller and wage higher than in the interior solution. 
However, a change in the floor will decrease total employment (wage) in a 
Stackelberg game if the floor would allow the Cournot outcome but not the 
Stackelberg interior solution for the follower; then, total employment is 
higher and wage lower than in the interior solution.  
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With homogeneous workers, the existence of high employment floors 
may induce entry deterrence behavior of the incumbent(s). When entry 
deterrence is being practiced, an increase in the floor decreases total 
employment - once it makes the incumbent's behavior less "costly". 
With a Stone-Geary utility function and linear demand schedule, we 
concluded that minimum employment rules are more likely to affect - 
directly - unions with higher preference for wage relative to employment. 
Entry deterrence practices seem more likely - "profitable" for the leader - 
when the follower has low preference for wage relative to employment; in 
that case, we expect larger total employment and lower wage than if entry 
deterrence was not engaged. The cooperative solution will imply a smaller 
employment of the unaffected union, a larger total employment and lower 
equilibrium wage than in the unconstrained maximum. 
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Table 1. Insufficient Membership of Union 2. 
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Table 2. Insufficient Employment of Union 2. 



















































































































































(One for each Stackelberg case) 
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Table 3. Insufficient Membership of Union 2 - Stone-Geary Utility and Linear Demand 
 Conditions Equilibrium Solution 
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Table 3.1. Insufficient Membership of Union 2 - Stone-Geary Utility and Linear Demand 
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Table 4. Insufficient Employment of Union 2 - Stone-Geary Utility and Linear Demand 








 /  
/ [1 - (1 - 
1
) (1 - 
2










 = (1 - 
1









 /  
/ [1 - (1 - 
1
) (1 - 
2









 /  
 / [1 - (1 - 
1










 / [1 - (1 - 
1











 /  
/ [1 - (1 - 
1
) (1 - 
2
)]  > L
_













 = (a/b) - [L
_









 /  
/ [1 - (1 - 
1
) (1 - 
2










 = (1 - 
1


















 a (1 - 
2




 = a (1 - 
1







(One for each Stackelberg case) 
L
2
 =  0 
L
1








a (1 - 
2











 =  (1 - 
1
) (a/b  - L
_
) / (1 + 
2




 a (1 - 
2





 =  a (1 - 
2




 =    a (1 - 
1










Journal of Economics Bibliography 










Table 4.1. Insufficient Employment of Union 2 - Stone-Geary Utility and Linear Demand 
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1  Citing Rosen (1970) as the first author to recognize strategic interdependency among 
unions. 
2 Also Davidson (1988), Dixon (1988), Dowrick (1989), Jun (1989) and Dobson (1994), for 
example, where the effect of the existence of oligopoly in the product market is 
investigated. 
3 After Cournot (1838). 
4 After Nash (1950). 
5 Von Stackelberg (1934). 
6 In MacDonald & Solow’s (1981) lines. 
7 Article 8º, §.2, D.L. 215-B/75, April 30th. Changes in union regulations are subject to similar 
requirements (10% of associates or 2000 workers) - Article 43º, §.1. “Unions” and 
Federations require one third of target unions – of the region or cathegory, respectively –, 
obbeying some majority of affiliated workers criteria, according to Article 8º, §.3. See 
Bettencourt & Baptista (1999).  
8 See, for example, Spence (1977), Dixit (1979 and 1980), and Schmalensee (1981) for the 
analysis of entry barriers in the product market, which work similarly to these restrictions. 
9 Even if in a different manner: Dixit's fixed costs introduce discontinuities in the reaction 
functions while in our case the type of employment constraints we consider produce 
kinks; discontinuities only arise with minimum employment rules. 
10 See Adnett (1996), p.27. 
11 See Prazeres (2001). 
12 CGTP-IN and UGT, the two major union confederations – that coordenate activity of 
(“primary”) unions, filliated in “unions” or federations. See Cerdeira (1997), p.57. 
13 Founded in 1978. See Cerdeira (1997), p.16, footnote 12. 
14 See Cerdeira (1997), p. 83. 
15 The reader is referred to Martins & Coimbra (1997) for additional comments on the 
solutions for two unions. This section summarizes the main results for the general case, 
needed for the following exposition. 
16 Nevertheless, most of the results below would also apply if this function represented the 
marginal revenue product of labor and if firms did not behave competitively in the 
product market. 
17 Existence is guaranteed by concavity of each union's utility function with respect to L
i
, 
















) < 0, which 




 ≤ 0, i=1,2, j=2,1. This ensures that optimal L
i
 falls as L rises. See 
Friedman (1983), p. 30-33. 
18 If we departed from a Cournot equilibrium... 




, the number of members of 
union 1 divided by the number of members of union 2. See Martins & Coimbra (1997 and 
1997a) for additional interpretation. 
20 Which could be derived from the problem 
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_
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21 Or to the minimum acceptable wage for union 2 to stay in the labor market according to 








 the level of L
1
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